Information sovereignty by Hagen, Benjamin Peter
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2004 
Information sovereignty 
Benjamin Peter Hagen 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Hagen, Benjamin Peter, "Information sovereignty" (2004). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 20565. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/20565 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
information sovereignty 
by 
Benjamin Peter Hagen 
A tl;esis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
11~aj or: Information Assurance 
Program of Study Committee: 
Steffen Schmidt, Major Professor 
James McCormick 
Thomas Daniels 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
20Q4 
Copyright 8 Benjamin Peter Hagen, 2004. All rights reserved. 
11 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
Benjamin Peter Hagen 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
Introduction 1 
Information Control 2 
A "Paradigm" Sluff 2 
Information Control and the Internet 6 
Political Models g 
The Realist Model 8 
The Liberal Model 9 
A Convergence 10 
A Question of Sovereignty? 11 
CIA 13 
Current Situation 16 
Statistics 16 
Internet Restriction (Chart: Countries &Internet Restriction) 17 
CHAPTER 2. A TECHNOLOGY REGIME 19 
Introduction 19 
A Brief History of the Internet 19 
International Standards Regime 21 
Packets &Switches 24 
A Network of Neighbors 26 
Unobvious Content 28 
Levels of Connection 28 
CHAPTER 3. REGIME ACCEPTANCE 31 
Pressure from Market Forces 31 
Secwity 3 l 
Transpazency 32 
1V 
Stability 
SovereiSnt3' 
C~:[APTER 4. CASE ST`UDiES 
China 
Gov~rn~nent Restrictions 
The Firev+ l 
Saudi Arabia 
tJSA 
C~[APTER ~. CO~tCLLJSIC,IN 
Regime 
Contrib~rting Factors 
Population 
Economy 
Go~ernn~ent Regime Type 
A General Relationship 
The Imp of Information Sovereignty 
F Considerations 
Bypassing .Software 
A.rn~s Race 
"Laws of Censo~p" 
A ~Tew Tax~onorny 
w Conc us~on 
REFEI~;~~I~10ES 
33 
33 
34 
34 
34 
35 
37 
40 
42 
42 
44 
44 
45 
47 
48 
49 
49 
49 
51 
~l 
~3 
53 
SS 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Intrr~duct~on 
This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between information technologies, 
sped caliy the Internet, and the nation-state system and answer several impor~:ant questions 
which impact the sovereignty of information: How does the Internet differ from previous 
forms o communication and media? How do these differences impact the sovereignty of 
information within the nation-state system? V~hat has been the reaction of the nation-state to 
the Internet? ~~~at factors affect the nation-state's decision to place controls on Internet 
access? 
Chapter one of this thesis examines the Internet as a fun~ental shift in the 
connmunications capability of humankind and arm that the In#~~rnet can be considered as a 
technology and slranda~rds regime which ensures the interoperability and technical sl~andards 
of domestic computer network that connect to the global Internet. An e~inaton of the 
technological background of the Internet is presented in chapter two. This examination 
suggests that this nevv form of communication impacts the sovereign ability of the nation-
state to control the flows of information both wig and across its borders. Chapter three 
examine the rolewhich international markets play in pron~otr~g the Internet regime. 
1Vlarkets desire compliance with the .international regime in order to ensure t~~nsparency, 
security, and stability. Nation-states make a rational cos~tlbenefits decision on the form which 
networking takes wig their domestic boundar%es and on what controls are placed upon 
access to the network.. There have been varied and diverse responses to the question of 
network access; from national firewalls and strictly controlled access privileges, to legislative 
barriers ar~d freedom of information movements. Chapter four introduces case studies of 
internee controls in China, Saudi Arabia, and. the LJS as examples of three different levels of 
control. Finally chapter five presents aggregate dicta which indicates a relationship between 
.nation-state controlled access to the Internet and several different economic and social factors 
including: user populations, per-capita income, and high-technology imports. 
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~T~t~or~n~t~at~ ~'~~t~ol 
ration states ~►r~nt to have control over the #lows of inforr~:~aton. The fundamental 
operations of the modern nation state rely upon its ability to control information. Voting, 
trade, taxes, education, transportation, and security all depend at some level upon the 
movement of infor~na#ion. With the proliferation of Internet access across the world the 
nation's ~:~►.dtional ability to control nforrnatlon ins come into question. In many parts of the 
world state control of the Internet is a modern reality. China, forth Korea, Cuba,. and Saudi 
Arabia are just a few of the states with established methods of controlling what infor~~aation 
their citizens are able to access on the Internet. Yet some states choose not to limit access at 
all; the reactions of states -are var%ed and diverse. Despite a strong desire to maim an 
ability to control information, nation states have ceded much of their control to modern forms 
of infor~:nation technology; in particular the Internet. yVhy do some states choose to control 
access vr~hile others do not? 
A "~a~~dg" ,S'~%fit 
Within recent years the Internet has become one of hum~nd's most power~~ul tools 
for information gathering and communication. It allows users connected at any point on the 
network to access a wealth of information on a truly diverse set of topics. moreover this new 
medium is not limited to a one way flow of information. Once connected to the network, 
most users have the ability to-not only receive information, but also b~nsmit it. This bi-
directional capability to both receive and t~~nsrnt inform:-anon creates a v~ealth of 
possibilities not yet realized by more traditional forms of media ..and communication. 
Ancient movements of information occurred simultaneously with the movement of 
the hen body. As ~oples crossed the great des of Earth so did their knowledge, 
histories, and under:~ding. Before the development of sophisticated and versatile forms of 
verbal communication humans were relegated to simplistic forms of information transfer. 
Those w%th knowledge could only spread it to those with the time and desire- to Learn through 
local and locally understood language. The movement of information was dependent upon 
the movements of people. 
With the wdespr~rad ad©pton of consistent languages across large populations 
humans could transfer ideas away from their source with increased speed and distance. A 
3 
new technique for farming could be passed from fanner to farmer until its spread met a limit 
of practicality or physicality. A mount=ain could stop information if there was no one willing 
to cross it ~ or if there was no one on the otb~er side who could understand the message once 
it arrived. Language allowed information to be passed away from the source. 
With the development of written forms of communication ideas could be passed more 
precisely than through verbal forms. ~s verbal messages cross human minds their messages 
invariably shift away from their original g. Written forins of communication are more 
permanent and persistent, Moreover copies can be made which are almost identical to the 
original. written language allowed information to become archived and duplicated with great 
accuracy, 
The mechanical printing press brought written communication to a mass audience. 
This technology demoted hu~ran labor to a minimum role in the duplication of information; 
machines did most of the physical work. The printing press allowed ideas to flow to large 
numbers of people and signif candy reduced the cost associated with producing mass 
quantities of written material. 
Early forms of electronic communication such as the telegraph greatly increased the 
speed and distance at which human communication could occur. The only limit to a 
message's final destination was the existence of infrastructure capable of relaying the 
message and t~:~aned operators with the ability to understand it. The telephone brought the 
capability for easy, near instantaneous, two way communication to much of the Earth. 
The Internet eliminates much of the expense once associated with traditional forms of 
publishing. It is now somewhat trivial to create a resource which can ~ accessed by millions 
of individuals. Previous forms of communication such as the telephone, radio, and television 
have all realized their own incarnations through Internet enabled technologies. New-world 
equivalents of old world communication systems are available, 
The Internet is significantly different from previous forms of communication in a 
number of ways: 
♦ Extraterritoriality' — On the Internet the source of information exists in a 
somewhat ethereal place. The computer which houses the information resides 
' Thierer (2003 ), p. 6 I 
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in a physical location; however this location is often not. plainly obvious or 
detectable, ̀ Thus the physicality of information is df cult or impossible to 
det~~aine. 
♦ Notice2 -- The transmission of infarn~ation occurs with little regard to the 
physical borders it crosses and thus jurisdiction over the flows of information 
is often di#~icult and wholly ~ali2~ed. Data t~~~nsmitted over the Internet has 
the ~tential to travel across the globe and through an immense number of 
jurisdictions before it finally reaches its fiinal d~tion. This data normally 
#ravels with.. little regard or hindrance from local jurisdictional i~~~'rastruch~res. 
For example data traveling from the IJS to +Germany through a connec~on .n 
Great Britain is not expected to differ in any way based upon its path through 
tertiary or conned countries. 
Spillover3 — In relation to "notice" any sort of control placed upon information 
in one jurisdiction could potentially "leaf" into the borders of another. This is 
increasingly possible as access providers become multi=national in scope.4
Controls ply upon infirastruotlu-e within one country could potentially 
affect the data traveling across it regardless of origin and destihation. 
♦ Insl~antaneous Comn~unication~ -The Internet provides near v~:~tantaneous 
communication.. Although this does not differ greatly from other forms of 
elec#ronic information, it does differ from normal forms of marl~et or 
commerce. The Internet creates the potential for goods and services to be sold, 
delivered., and consumed at near instantaneous speeds. 
♦ Low Marginal ~ost6 -Publishing infor~aton on the is significantly 
cheaper than most forms of publis-ping. For print, radio, and television the 
si;art-up cost to produce published materials is enormous (usually involving 
Z Thierer (2003 ), p. 61 
s 7'Hierer (2003), p. 62 
a Thierer (2003), p. 62 
S Thierer (2003 ), p. 78 
6 Thierer (2003), p. 78 
5 
the purchase of a printing press, or radio/Tv transmitter). If only considered in 
terms of publishing cost (not considering the cost of authorship, etc.) the 
Internet represents a signif cant change from previous fog of publication. 
♦ Little to no Error in ~uplic~ation~ - As a digital medium the Internet provides 
very little chance of error in duplication. The digital medium makes error 
checking and correction very easy and often built into the ~ific protocol 
used for communication. 
♦ Translation$ -The automatic translation of digital documents is becoming 
inc~r~ra:singly accurate and cost effective. The Internet makes the potential for 
automatic t ~slation of an enormous amount of information a real possibility. 
Normal forms of media such as print, radio, or television all require an. 
enormous amount of time and money to produce a quality transla~t~ed copy of 
the original. 
♦ Audience -- The Internet creates the potential for a huge audience for any 
given piece of information. The most active websites receive millions of hits 
every day. Although in most forins of Internet communication the popularity 
of a resource is dependant upon the active request of the consumer, the 
potential exists for any percentage of the total user base to access any single 
bit of information. 
♦ scope —The intErrnet encompasses not only an immense amount of 
information and a diverse set of topics; the user base of the Internet is perhaps 
the most diverse collection of v~orld populations ever collected. Previous 
forms of n~.ass media have attracted huge audiences; however they have never 
had the potential to reach so many, so quickly, with so little cost in duplication 
and publication. 
All of these factors contribute to making the Internet a significant shift in the 
communications potential and practice humankind. 
' 'Thierer (2000, p. 7$ 
~ Thierer (2003), p. 78 
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Information Cantrr~~ and tie Internet 
Nation-states, in large part, retain some sort of control -over the manner in which the 
Internet is allowed to exist in each country. Government regulatory agencies control 
in~tructure and acce:~s concerns.. Timothy wu notes that "at the most basic level, a state 
can simply choose not have any connection to the Internet.." This choice However is not a 
simple b~~ary decision. To lin~.it or deny connectivity to the Internet inherently limits the 
benefits gained from the "information revolution." 
Aside from issues of access and availability, countries der have the ability to limit 
the u.se of the Internet via software and hardware limitations. Sophisticated software filters 
enable a country to block only the portions of the Internet it deems ofd limits to its citizens. 
These can occur ax several technological levels. The simplest forms enable the government to 
block access to a specific list of Internet sites. This site or IP based filter is akin to black 
listing certain telephone numbers or international addresses. More sophisticated filters are 
able to analyze the content of what is being done on the Internet. For example a protocol 
bared filter could prevent peer-to-peer based file sharing or entail, whereas a content filter 
could prevent users from accessing sites with blacklist words, ideas, or pictures. 
respite the sophistication of access limiters, they can never be 1 oo°/fl accurate when 
the content of, or access to the Internet is not directly controlled by the nation-state. Just as 
sophisticated software access controls exist, so also exist sophisticated programs designed to 
bypass those access controls. Through encryption, anonymous proxies, and other methods 
there will likely always remain ways for software barriers to be breached. These are not, 
however, likely to reach mainstream acceptance. Individuals motivated enough to search out 
and u.se anti-regulatory technology may be able to do so, however mass populations will not. 
A gove~rnn~ent's decision to limit access to the Internet is acost-benefits calculation. 
There are Several different forms of access control available to nation states. These can be 
generally classified into three di#~erent areas: legislative controls, access controls, and 
technological controls. 
Legislative controls involve legal restrictions on what information may be transmitted 
over the Internet. These often take the form of legislation which specifically disallows the 
ti-ansmisson of certain content.: pornography, gambling related websites, etc. For example 
the LJS, as well as many other nations, prohibits the possession and transmission of child 
pornography. Legislation provides the restriction. 
Access controls deal with how the state delegates permission to access information 
systems. In the broadest sense the state can regulate the Internet providers and require them 
to meet cer~taiil standards or restrictions. In the strictest sense the state may require a license 
in -order for users to have access to the Internet and control a gover~unent owned monopoly 
on access to the Internet. Within North Korea only authorized individuals are allowed to have 
access to the Internet. The government controls any potential "mis-use" of the Internet by 
preventing the general population from having access. 
Technological controls attempt to control the actual information as it is transmitted 
over the Internet. Technological controls take one of three forms; client side controls, server 
side controls, and ir~~structure controls. Client side controls exist on the user's machine and 
prevent the user from accessing certain forms of information based upon the user's 
computer's knowledge of what is permissible and v~hat isn't. Client side controls often take 
the form of watchdog programs which prevent computer users from accessing material 
deemed inappropriate (programs which prevent children from viewing adult material is one 
exarnple~. Many t1S libraries install client side controls which prevent libr~~ry users from 
messing "inappropriate" sites while in the libr~~ry. Server side controls exist at the source of 
information and control who la~as access to it b►a,sed upon a knowledge of who is attempting to 
access what information. This t~rpe of control often exists as a barrier limiting access to a 
cerltai.n set of users; for example students at a specific university, or customers who have paid 
a subscription fee. In~tructt~.re controls have the most wide reaching potential for control. 
They exist within the Internet's infrastructure itself and monitor the ts~ffic which passes 
through it. These controls can analyze Internet t ic on a number of levels but offers only 
block a certain set of blacklisted websites or sources of information. These forms of 
frequently take the form of f~irewall which block certain content from being acce~s~►ed by a 
certain population. For example Saudi Arabia operates a nation wide f"irewall which prevents 
access to a list of sites that violate gover~unent regulations or the Islamic faith. 
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Political Models 
The international system is diverse in actors and reaction. As with any social system, 
the international nation state system is difficult to predicK. Political science provides a variety 
of theories as to how the system functions and makes decisions. No ane theory can produce 
an analysis which provides comprehensive predictive ability. However when used in 
appropriate circumstances with appropriate assumptions, they do pmvide deeper insights as 
to the reasoning and rational behind state action. The two most populaz and general #h~ries 
of nation state behavior are the realist and liberal models. 
The Rea~st Model 
The realist believes that the nation state is the key actor within the international 
system. Nation states, through either direct or v~3irect means, have more or less absolute 
control over their sovereign regions and- are the primary voices within global politics. There 
are several key assumptions which the realist view ~riakes about the international system. 
first, the inter atonal system is a~r~~rchc. The state is the highest level of organization wig 
the system; hence there is no controlling factor above the nation state.. Second, states act 
rationally to nr~aximze their benefit. when f with a decision they determine which 
actions will produce the most gain for themselves. This is a logical process and is calculated 
bused upon their access to nfor~nation and their underst<~.ndin~g of the probably reactions of 
Other actor v~thln the mternatlonal system. Fi~c~aliy, states act as a singular -actor within the 
international system. Regardle;~s of the inteanal makeup of each s#~~te, their actions wig the 
inte~onal system are made with a singular voice. 
T'.he realist view of international politics holds the nation state as the regulator of both 
its ov~rn internal struct~~re and its interaction within the international system. The state has 
sovereign control over its various components: population, economy, mili#~~ry, etc. The 
realist views information as another area of sovereign state control. The state's role is clear; 
the state has the right and responsibility to regulate and control the information which flows 
both within and across its borders. Criven the rational nature of the realist nation state, the 
decision to implement controls wi11 be a costlbenefits calculation. 
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The Liberal Model 
Liberal theory believes that tli~ international system benefits from. the existence of so 
called "liberal" states which place a strong emphasis on cgs such as personal freedoms, 
public participation in the political process, and government support and regulation of the 
market. Moravcsik proposed the follov~ring three main assumptions as the basis of liberal 
theory:9
1. The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private 
groups, who are on the avurage rational and risk-averse and who orgy 
exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under 
constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in 
societal influence. 
2. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic 
society on the basis of whose inter+~:~ts sti~te officials define state preferences 
and act purposively in world politics. 
3. The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state 
behavior. 
'VVitliin the general liberal context Moravcsik also identifies three different focus 
variants within liberal theory: ideational liberalism, conunercial liberalism, and republican 
liberalisn~~0. Ideational liberalism bases state preference and action upon the configuration of 
domestic social groups. fihus in barn, international policy and practice is an extrapolation of 
the domestic configurations of each individual state. Commercial liberalism sees changes 
wig markets as the driving force for international and domestic action and policy. ~s the 
costs for certain gam, services, and actions changes governments act to facilitate or block 
curtain exchan es throw h economic and securi licies.l ~ R ublican liberalism focuses g g ty Po ~ 
on the state's form of domestic political representation. If the political structure of a state 
9 Moravcsik (1997), p. 51 b 
io Moravcsik (1997), p. 524 
' 1 Moravcsik (1997), p. 528 
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promotes the interests of a certain group, that group will utilize national policy to their 
benefit.l~ 
with these a:~sumptions and focal points in mind we can better determine the role 
which IT and the Internet plays in a liberal-based world. Republican liberalism would focus 
on who is in control of any given state regime and loop at the nation's IT policy as an 
extension of practices which benef ilt those i.n power. Thus a country which is donated by 
the economic upper classes would Likely propose IT policy which benefits those groups. 
Commercial liberalism looks at IT policy as a tool for market regulation and control, thus the 
state would desire to maintain an ability to influence the ability of transaction over the 
Internet. Finally, Ideational liberalism views IT policy as an ext~~polation of domestic social 
preference. Should a society desire free and unrestricted access, than the government should 
respond to the society's request. In general it would appear that Liberal theory sees the 
information technology and the Internet as a tool with v~~hich governments can express the 
preference of different actors; either societal groups, groups in positions of power, or markets. 
Thus government policy will reinforce the desire of these political actors. 
A Convergence 
~;ach of the models addressed above presents a different view of the international 
system. This a~rialysis will focus on a view b~a.sed upon the realist assertion that the nation 
state is the primary actor within international relations., and that the state is a rational actor 
seeking to maximize utility. Aith©ugh the international system is populated with several 
different tees of actors this analysis will view them as subor~te to the nation state. 
The Internet exists outside the normal boundaries of the international state system. It 
is comprised of hardware, software, and individuals with potentially nogg else in con~rnon 
except the fact that they are all connected to a common computer network. This presents a 
potential problem to the traditional ideals of realist state theory: the Internet exists as an 
entity Bch exists both within state borders and outside of them. There is no noticeable 
difference between a website hosted within the borders of a capitalist country and one hosted 
within the borders of socialist one. Similarly, users from one country are more-or-less 
la Moravcsik (1997), p. 530 
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indistinguishable from users in another country. The Internet is a platform which nominally 
erases the borders of traditional state geographies. The popularization of information 
technologies such as the Internet carries with it the potential to significantly impact the 
international system and the manner in which states define their own borders. 
A ~uest~tt o,~'Sr~vereig~ly? 
Political scientists have long debated the exact nature of the international system and 
the various roles of the actors which it encompasses. Regardless of which political model, 
school, or philosophy subscribed to any a~rialysis of the international system cannot ignore the 
role which states play in determining global affairs. In realizing the significance of this role 
the complications of sovereignty enter into consideration. The exact definition of sovereignty 
has rsistently been a popular topic for academic debate13. ,Although there remain definite 
disc eements over the exact role of sovereignty, John Ruggie provides a definition which ~' 
can be used as a broad base for fiarther a~r~alysis. Ruggie defined sovereignty as "the 
iristitutionalizaton ofpublic authority wig n3~xcually exclusive jurisdictional zones."~a
The powers of states and the exact nature of sovereignty have never been si~atic.l s 
Issues such as the migration of populations, the growing interdependence of economic 
systems, and the rise of sub and supra-state organizations have been grouped under the 
header of globaliza~on as a new occurrence wig the international system. These trends, 
however, have exislted throughout history in some form or other. infra-state relations and 
inter-state relations can be said to exist in di#~erent spheres; the proximity and rigidity of 
those spheres varies over time as the natl~.re of the relationships between states change. 
wig the political interstate system countries exist as distinct actors. A nation's 
sovereignty has traditionally been defined by its borders and the limits of its ability to project 
physical power. With the increasing reliance of nations upon the world market sovereignty 
has come to mean something both broader and less coherent St<~tes can no longer count 
then~.selves as completely separate and self reliant from the international system. Nations 
13 Labe (2000, p. 304 
14 Barkin (1994), p. 107 
1S Zekos { 1999) 
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depend upon the exports and resources of other countries to provide their own citizens with 
the necessities of modem life. This realization has created a polarity within the contextual 
basis of sovereignty. 
States within the international system realize two different forms of sovereignty. The 
fast is an internal sovereign control over the populations and resources within their 
recognized temtorial boundaries, the second is an external sovereign right to independent 
decision-making within the international system. 
Internal sovereignty pertains to a nation's right and ability to control what happens 
within its borders. This normally encompasses the right to pass and enforce legislation and 
taxation laws. Weber saw this as a more general right to have a monopoly over violence16. At 
one time a country's sovereign internal rights gave it t~ ability to have complete 
independence in the decision making process. No matter the issue's significance or impact 
upon the country's citizenry they were largely left alone in terms of decision and 
consequence. Only recently has the international system become urterested in the internal 
affairs of sovereign nations. Human and environmental rights are two of the lazger issue 
areas which have become targets for intervention. The rationalization for intervention in 
these two areas comes from the potential impact to outside countries and the alleged greater 
good of the world population. For example damage to the local environment of a nation state 
has the potential to spread to other areas and impact the general future outlook of the global 
environment. Similarly human rights abuses are generally thought unethical and immoral by 
the world population and thus when significant human rights abuses are discovered outside 
intervention is sometimes called for by the international community. Moreover the potential 
for an exodus of refugees from the offending country to external nations increases the 
potential impact of human rights abuses on outside actors. 
The realm of internal communication and information transfer is one of the traditional 
sovereign rights of the nation state. Governments are recognized to have the ability to 
establish and enforce legislation pertaining to the rights of its citizenry to communicate and 
transfer information. This specific area of sovereignty takes many real world forms. Controls 
over the media and free speech directly impact the ability of a nation's citizenry to 
16 Weber (1946), p. 78 
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communicate with each other. Technology ba;~ed legislation is similarly under the sovereign 
control of the state. The electromagnetic spec~:~u~n through which radio, television, cellular 
phone systems, aid many other technologies conmunicate is also often regulated by the 
government. In the United States the- FCC has been given governmental authority to partition 
use of the electromagnetic s~~ect-um amongst organizations .and technologies. In order for a 
radio or T~ station to legally t~~ansmit i_n the tJS they must f rst be licensed by the FCC. 
These foams of legislation have several purposes; they orgynize t1~e use of public resources 
(such as the electromagnetic spectrum) and enforce certain content standards (such as the use 
of inappropriate language and adult content). Internal sovereign control over information 
gives nations the ability to reg~ate the content, context, and technology used to 
connnuncate. 
Exte~ sovereignty pertains to a nation's ability to ~r~ake independent decisions 
within the .international system. Nation states traditionally hard the ability to act as equal and 
independent actors. Theoretically there exists no higher form of organization than the nation 
state. In this way, according to realist theory, the international system is anarchic. Exteri~al 
sovereignty grants nations the ability to act as equal and independent actors within this 
anarchic system. Just as internal sovereignty is no longer absolute, neither is exter~:~al 
sovereignty. The modern nation state comes under pressure from a myriad of actors in a 
variety of forms; other nation states, international organizations, and regunes of a variety of 
composition and purpose. International agr~rements and norms greatly affect the ability of 
nation states to act independently within the international system. 
International regimes which create the s1~ar~dards and technologies that enable #Ile 
Internet to function exert pressure upon individual states to comply with their standards. 
External nation states exert pressure and control through international markets and support. 
The Internet enables populations to communicate and transfer information both inside 
and across the boundaries of sovereign states. In its raw and uncontrolled form the Internet 
does not have any underlying ability to regulate content, 
CIA 
The exact nature of security within the international system is often considered only 
in terms of physical security and warfare. When the sovereignty of information is brought 
14 
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into question so is the related field of information security; or rather who has access to v~~hat 
information. The CIA {Confidence, integrity, and Accessibility) model of security is a 
connno~ method for assessing the strengths and weakness of secure computer systems. This 
model addresses tl~e three main responsibilities of any sys~te~m where security is a major 
concern. An application of this model to the current dilemma of the nation state and 
information sovereignty can provide insight into the motivation of nations to "secure" their 
information. Confidentiality concerns who has access to what data., ~tegrity concerns 
knowing that information can only be changed by authorii~ed actors, and accessibility 
pertains to preserving the ability to reach information. 
Controls placed upon the Internet have a definite effect on the security of information. 
Through an application of the CIA model of security we can better understand the affect 
access controls have upon two groups: the Internet user {or the people affected by access 
controls), and the nation state {the entity implementing access controls). 
At some level the flrewall ~ the capability to affect all three levels of the CIA 
model for the end users of information technology. Confidentiality is inherently contradicted 
in the a~r~alysis of information as it is being passed down line to the user. Filtering and 
black, by nature, involves the analysis of information. Once f ltering mecl~anisnis have 
been put in place it is trivial to add fisrther features such as the long  or flagging of 
information. Integrity is der ed by these systems. The potential exists for access 
control sys~ to-alter information rather than simply denying access to it. For example, a 
news article deemed offensive by the government could be effectively replaced by a 
gover~unent rewrite v~►Thich elites any o#~ensive tone or information. Accessibility is 
affected by the siune system. Users cannot reliably access information on the Internet. The 
prevention of access to curtain information is inherent within the nature of access controls. 
Although these systems are theoretically not limiting access to inoffensive information, the 
added level of network a~rialysis adds another point of failure for access to even normally 
accessible information. Should the access control- systems ga down, it is quite possible that 
the entire system world be shut down. 
'The issue must also be examined from the perspective of the nation state. 
Goverllrnents must have reasons to implement restrictions to the access of information 
technologies. Some of these motives become clear when the CIA model is applied to the 
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nation state; an entity whose goal is the altruistic protection and stability of the people it 
governs. For governments, confidentiality is affected when a user has access to information 
the government hopes to keep secret. The Internet as a medium for the fast and easy 
transmission of information has the potential to quickly disseminate "state secrets" to those 
without the proper access. For the many governments this not only includes the traditional 
states secrets which have flavored spy movies for decades, but includes information 
regarding opposition groups and any information which would affect the stability of a regime 
and system. Integrity is violated when the Internet allows access to its people by outside 
parties. T#us is inherent in the international nature of the Internet and other information 
technologies. Not only do the citizens of a country have access to information spread across 
the globe, but due to the two way nature of access within many information systems other 
groups and nation states have access to the citizens of a sovereign country. This includes 
groups as benign as spam mailers to groups as dangerous as opposition or terrorist groups. 
Accessibility is affected when the intemet diminishes the affect of a native monopoly on 
news and information. 
A paradox exists between the security of the individual and the security of the nation 
state. The CIA model expresses the obvious conflicts of interest. On one side the individual 
wants security in the information he or she receives and generates, and on the other hand the 
government (or extrapolation of society) desires some level of control over communication in 
order to have stability and a presence in the dissemination of information. Access controls 
are the nation states attempt to resolve the security issues made clear in an application of the 
CIA model. Most of the outrage and concern by foreign media is a clear concern at the 
individual's level. 
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Statistics 
The Internet has experienced tremendous growth since its acceptance into popular 
culture. The World Bank reported that in 1991 there were roughly 4,300,000 users of the 
Internet. That number drastically increased in the coming decade to reach nearly 500,000,000 
users worldwide in 20011 ~. (See Figure 1) This is a phenomenal amount of growth for any 
type of communications based network. 
With over 500,000,000 users in 2001, the Internet is used by 1/I2 of the world 
population. The distribution of users is not even across geographic or economic boundaries; 
however 1/12 of the world population is not an insignificant number of users. Increases in 
Internet users have far outpaced increases of the general world population. The Internet has 
"World Bank (2~4) 
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consistently seen increases in excess of 59% from 1991-2001. The world population 
increases at a rate of between 1 %and 2%. 
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Countries 
Restricted, 19 
Countries 
Figure 2. Countries &Internet Restriction 
Internet Restriction (Chart: Countries &Internet Restriction) 
This paper uses data gathered by the Freedom House in their 2001 Press Freedom 
Survey. Within the annual Press Freedom Survey the Freedom House calculates a freedom of 
press rating for most of the countries in the world. Within the 2001 survey they also 
calculated an Internet restriction rating for many countries. They based their rating on an
examination of "each country's Internet penetration, regulatory environment and intent, and 
cost of Internet access, [they] categorized countries as Most Restrictive, Moderately 
Restrictive, or Least Restrictive" 1 s Each of the three restriction levels has certain 
characteristics are shared in common with other similarly rated countries: 
' g Press Freedom Survey 2001 
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♦ "Most Restrictive countries may permit only the state-run Internet service 
provider (ISP) to Garry citizens' messages. Even if a private ISP operates, it 
may be under state surveillance. Citizens are subjected to fines, harassment, 
imprisonment, or worse for dissenting from official policies or for messages 
deemed seditious." i 9 Wig this paper "Most Restrictive" countries are 
referred to simply as "restricted." 
♦ "Moderate restriction includes political as well as ecanon~ic limitation on 
access to the Web and legal or administrative restrictions on content with 
punishment for violations."Zo
♦ "The least restrictive nations provide liberal access to the Web, and little if 
any content control." 21 Within this paper "least restrictive" countries are 
refereed to as having fair restriction. 
Of the 128 countries rated by the Freedom House 19 were d to have restricted 
Internet access, 53 moderate restriction, and 56 fair restricition tSee Figure 2). The study 
only examined countries where enough information could be fa~ound to make an accurate 
determination of their restricition level. 
This paper also uses information from the World Bank's 2~4 Economic Indicators 
database for more general social and economic statistics. The World Bank identifies over 2t}0 
distinct national identities within their country database and provides data on economic, 
social, and technological factors. Data is not avialable for all countries and all time periods, 
however in general the World Bank provides a useful standard from which to make a 
generalised analysis. 
' 9 Press Freedom Survey 2001 
20 Press Freedom Survey 2001 
Z' Press Freedom Survey 2001 
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CHAPTER 2. A TECHNOLOGY REGIME 
Introduction 
There are several technological factors which directly impact the ability of nation 
states to control the access of information over the Internet. The most influential factor is the 
existence su international regime which enforces certain technological d~isions upon 
international community members who wish to be connected to the Internet. These standards, 
in turn, limit the technical ability of states to control the information which flows over there 
localized region of the Internet. In particulaz the packet based routing behavior of the Internet, 
the fact that content is separated from c while it travels across the Internet, and the 
reliance upon physical neighbors for connectivity restricts the ability of nation states to exert 
domestic control over the Internet. 
A Brief History of the Internet 
In order to understand the reasoning behind current networking technologies and 
administrative procedures it is first helpful to have an understanding of the history behind the 
Internet. The Internet is something which defies a strict definition. Part of the problem stf~ms 
from its constantly changing nature. Henry Perrit Jr. defined the Internet as "an international 
network of computers and computer networks connected to each other and sharing a common 
name and address space." Furthermore he adds that "the Internet is not a corporation or 
administrative arrangement; it is a method for connecting computer systems, and the 
phenomenon of very widespread adherence to that method."~ The Internet is the sure of its 
parts. The Internet had very clear beginnings, and an origin which would later affect not only 
its technological shape but its practical one as well. 
During the early decades of the cold war the United States faced the problem of 
building a communications network which could withstand a devastating nuclear assault. 
State of the art networks of the time relied upon direct or obviously routed circuit 
connections to provide end-to-end communication. Researchers posed with the problem of 
~ Pewit { 1997), p. l60 
~ Sterling {1993) 
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developing a cotnmunications network v~Thich could withstand a nuclear assault found their 
solution through decentralization. The Rand organization produced a report detailing a 
computer network which would have "no central authority, and be designed to operate in 
tatters."24
This r~:port was the theoretical beginning of what was to become the Internet. 
Research into Large computer networks was ~.rst inspired by J.C.R. Licklider, the first head of 
computer research at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DA►RPA). Licklider 
was interested in a computer network which spanned the globe and enabled its us~Vrs to 
access information and pros from other computers. Licklider passed on his interest to 
hiss later successors at DARPA. Packet switching (a key technology which connects networks 
on the Internet and is discussed in depth later) as a computer Networking method was first 
proposed by a researcher at ALIT in 1961. The first recorded instance of connecting two long 
dislrrance r~rmote machines via computer network occurred in 19{5 between a computer in 
Mass<rchusetts and a computer in California2S. The expansion of "wide-area" computer 
networking has increased from this initial population of two to over 500,000,000 users 
according to 2001 data26. Qne participant in this early experiment in computer networking, 
Lawrence Cr. Roberts, went on to publish the plan for a computer network called 
"~►RPA~~ET" in 1967. 
~'he first node or connection to ~►RP~~~TET was located in UCLA and established in 
fall 1969. By the end of the year there would be a total of 4 Hades on the network. Expansion 
continued each year; with 1 S nodes in 1971 and 37 nodes in 1972. 
Open-architecture netwo~ v~~a~s a key component of ARPA~~TET, This technology 
allows computer networks to be diverse on the micro-scale but interconnected via a common 
protocol on the era -scale. Thus computer networks could vary according to location, 
resources, and need but still communicate with a larger scale collection of networks via a 
conunon protocol. Open-architecture networking was first introduced by Robert I~:ahn 
2a Sterling (1993) 
~ Leiner (2003) 
26 world Bank (2004) 
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{DARPA) in 1972. This idea of combining or interweaving networks was called 
"Internettng." 
K:ah1i first sought to i~nplelnent open-architecture networki~ag over packet radio 
networks. Due to the inherent unreliability of radio networking {signals can be j wed or 
blocked by physical obstacles) the then standard Network Control Protocol (NCP) was not an 
adequate solution to his problem. NCP a:~surned a reliable connection and was not robust 
enough to handle lost messages and relied upon the network to provide end-to-end error 
control. Moreover, NCP did not allow much routing flexibility. NCP's inadequatene;~s led 
Kahn to develop a new protocol which would later become known as the Transmission 
Control ProtocollIliternet Protocol {TCP~'). 
"Four ground rules were critical to Kahn's early thin~~z~~~ 
1. The base design and technology of a local network could differ from that of 
the Internet. No redesign of the local network would b►e necess~iry in order for 
it to be connected to the Internet. 
2. The success of a #i~anslnission could not be teed. If a packet could not 
reach 1tS des~tinatlon polnt, It 1S up t0 the- Or1~Or t0 retrdilSlrilt. 
3. Gateways and routers would be designed as interconnection points on the 
network. They would be simple and require no n~ernory of the ts~affic which 
passes through them. 
4. loo higher authority over the network would exist beyond the local level. Thus 
there could be no global form of control. 
Although the TCPIIP protocol has evolved since K:ahn's early design, all four of his 
ground rules continue to hold true. 
International Standards Regime 
The adoption of standards by the Internet community represents a great achievement 
in the spread of methods and systems. Despite potentially local differences in language, 
hardware, software, and purpose, all computers connected to the Internet are theoretically 
2~ ~.,einer {2003 ) 
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able to communicate with each other. Without a system of standardization this would be 
impossible. 
The Internet, however, cannot be considered simply a technical system which 
happens to have widespread acceptance. For the Internet to function and exist on a global 
level there must be a certain degree of acceptance, governance, and maintenance within the 
technical collaboration. As technologies and societies evolve their relationships with the 
Internet, so mu$t the system as a whole change and evolve in order to persist across these 
dynamic changes. Timothy wu proposes that "it may be useful to think of cyberspace as a 
kind of international regime." zs 
~;ra.sner def ned regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for nuking and implementing collective choice."29
Krasner promised the following causal factors which lead to regime develop~nent:3o
1. Egoistic self-interest —This refers to the desire of an a~~tor to maximize their 
own interest without a concern for the utility of other actors. 
2. Political power —Here power is divided into two different interest groups: 
power in service of the common good, and power in the service of particular 
interests. Power in service of the common good refers to the use of power to 
provide a common good or benefit the entire community. Power in the service 
of particular interests involves the use of power to increase the utility of a 
single actor. 
3. Dorms and principles —Principles and norms are the underlying and 
"defining" characteristics of a group or system. 
~ Wu (1997), p. 656 
~`' I~;rasner (1995), p. 2 
30 I~:ra~sn~r (1995), p. 10-20 
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~. Usage and custom — "Usage refers to a regular patterns of behavior based on 
actual practice; custom to long-stranding practice." 3 i 
5. Knowledge -- Within the context of regimes knowledge can be defined as "the 
sum of technical information and of theories about that information which 
commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to 
serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal." 32
The Internet and its wide acceptance within the international system meet many of 
these causal factors for regime development. The Internet fulfills the egoistic self-.interest of 
state actors. By developing the basic networking technology v~~h.ich interconnects the Internet, 
countries increase their native YT capabilities. By disseminate this technology and a11ov~~ing 
other countries to "get on line" the nation is increasing the total amount of information on the 
network without much negative impact on the domestic IT capabilities of the originator. 
Therefore by developing and allowing access to the technology axi actor incomes their own 
utility while also increasing the utility of other technological participants. 
The technological and administrative norms of computer networking create a 
situation where a regime is likely to form. In order for network users to be reliably 
interconnected they must abide by a certain set of ~dards, These include both 
technological standards covering the hardware and software which collectively makes up the 
Internet, and the ad~ninistraxive standards which govern the allocation of network resources 
(such as IP addresses and domain names). Connection to the Internet creates a community 
which shares an adherence to these norms and standards. 
Furthermore the Internet qualifies under the areas of usage, custom, and knowledge. 
Users of the Int~;~-net have become oblivious to the source or destination of their content. The 
basic Internet technologies of the world wide web, and email continue to dominate t~.~ic 
patterns across the globe. t7sers are used to certain technologies anal usage patterns. 
11~oreover the knowledge rewired to use the Internet is more or less universal a~~ross borders, 
In particular the software used to access information on the Internet is more or less universal 
across national boundaries. Most Internet users nriake use of a very limited set of software 
~ ~ I~:rasner (~ 995), p. 1 S 
s2 I~:rasner (1995), p. 19 
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programs to access and communicate information on the Internet. For example there are only 
2 or 3 mayor web browsers from which users may choose in order to access the information 
available via the 'World Wide web. These browsers are all somewhat similar in use and it is 
relatively easy for users to migrate between them. This creates a collection of users who are 
unified in usage patterns. 
The Internet therefore satisfies several of the causal characteristics of an international 
regime. Its existence and wide spread popularity would point to the formation's success. Wu 
found that "characterizing the Internet as an international regime seems eminently plausible. 
Those states which have permitted Internet access at all have implicitly agreed, at a minimum, 
to a set of technical sltandards that facilitate the b~nsmsson of data over the Internet." 33
As a regime the Internet requires an adherence to Grrtain technological sl~andards for 
membership. These coincide with r~iany of the protocols and administrative procedures 
discussed in the above short history of the Internet. Several of these technological 
requirements d, irectly affect the ability of the nation state to control the nfor~rr~ation which 
flows over its domestic networks and onto the international networks. 
Packets 8c Switches 
Although information sent on the Internet will more than likely reach its final 
destination, its route and success is never guaranteed. At its most basic level the Internet uses 
packet based networking to move information from one point to another. Information sent 
over the Internet is split into small portions of data called packets. F,ach packet is addressed 
with information which identifies the sending computer's address and the rexeiving 
computer's address. The packet is than sent out onto the network to the originating 
computer's gateway. The gateway is a form of a more general device salted a router. Routers 
aze typically simple communications devices which look at each packet and redirect to 
another router which is closer to the final destination. The packet reaches its final destination 
when a router with a direct connection to the destination computer receives the packet and 
forwards it to the final computer. 
33 Wu ~19~7), p. 658 
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The path which packets take can vary according to many dii~erent factors. Routers 
have a very limited knowledge of the network. In most cases they cannot calculate the entire 
route a packet will travel. They simply act as waypoints to send a packet closer to its fiinal 
destination. 
I~na~gine a hypothetical ~ system which interconnects the cities of the United 
States. The system is huge and there is no map of the entire system. A train departing from 
New York bound for Los Angeles does not know the mast direct route to its final destination; 
it simply knows that it should head west. At each int~~~section or train stop it can ask the local 
conductor for directions. No conductor knows the entire route the train should take but can 
get it one step closer to Los Angeles. If a certain line of the tracks is out of service the 
conductor can redirect the train around the problem area via a different route. Packet 
networking works in a similar fashion. Packets are sent from the source computer with no 
idea of the f na1 route they will take. At each intersection of the network they are routed to a 
new intersection based upon a limited knowledge of the network's archit#~ture. Eventually 
they arrive at their fiinal destination. 
Packet networking limits the ability of any single entity to control the t~~c on a 
network. Due to the decentralized nature of packet networks, it is very di#~cult for a single 
authority to control all the different potential routes of t1.~affic a packet may take. There are 
only two points which a packet is more or less teed to travel across: the router clos~rst 
to the destination computer and the router closest to the ori~ting computer. The packet is 
capable of t<~king any number of potential routes on its way across the network; even packets 
ori~tng from the same computer, bound for the same destination are not guaranteed to 
travel across the same points on the network. 
This farm of networking fulfilled the requirements of the original D,A►RPA project 
design for a computer network capable of surviving despite great infrastructural losses. 
Should part of the networked be destroyed or disconnected from the network, packets can 
travel on alternative routes v~~llich bypass the gaps in the network. 
Forcing all network ts c to pass through a single point on the network (such as a 
monitoring station) is not practical because no single point on the network is capable of 
handling all of the network's tx-a c. 
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By requiring the use of packet based networking to connect to the global network, the 
Internet lunits any potential of network control to the physical boundaries of its borders. 
Once traffic leaves the area under which the nation may have influence over the network's 
muting behavior the nation releases any possibility of controlling or monitoring network 
traffic. Nations do retain the ability to enforce non-packet based networking within their 
domestic borders. Moreover the state may place requirements upon the routing behavior of 
internal packet and non-packet based traffic. If packet based networking is used within the 
domestic networking infrastructure (as is the case within most nations) the country makes 
any potential control very difficult In order to have a guazanteed ability to monitor traffic 
they must have the ability to monitor any given routing point on the network. When the 
number of network users increases the difficulty in monitoring also increases. Additional 
users require the addition of additional infrastructure; complicating the network's 
architecture and routing potential. 
Packet networking affects the nation's internal sovereign control over the information 
which flows within their borders. TCP/IP based packet networking infrastructure is 
established they lose the ability to accurately predict the paths which information will take. 
Should the government have a monopoly over the control of all the routing points of a 
network they could theoretically maintain some sort of guaranteed ability to monitor traffic. 
They could reroute suspicious traffic of interest through azeas nodes with the ability to record 
or monitor data. Once traffic leaves this area of routing control the domestic network has no 
guarantee over the path trai~ic will take. Therefore should an unregulated packet networking 
infrastructure exist within the domestic sphere, internal sovereignty is directly threatened. 
Once the data Leaves an area of controlled routing the data has the ability to pass through 
proxy routing systems which can obscure the final destination of information. 
A Network of Neighbors 
The Internet uses a variety of means to transmit information: fiber optic cable, 
telephone lines, radio, cable television lines, satellite, etc. Despite this potentially immense 
variety there aze relatively few methods to interconnect the local networks which make up 
the Internet. These connections require incredible speed and reliability in order to be practical 
and effective. Modern systems almost exclusively use high speed cabled connections to 
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connect to the Internet backbone. This cabling requires a physical route and connection from 
one point on the domestic network to some point on an earternal network. 
The end user connects to the Internet through an Internet Service Provider (ISP). ISPs 
maintain the connections and infrastruchu~e necessary to establish connections amongst their 
customers. When information must flow betw~n ISPs the da#a must pass through a Network 
Access Point (NAP) or Exchange Point (EP)~. This is analogous to airplane hubs. If a 
passenger wishes to fly to a location not directly supported by his or her local airline he or 
she can fly to a hub, get off the local airline's plane and use a different airline which provides 
service to the customer's final destination. Similarly, if an Internet user wishes to send 
information from their computer connected to ISP A to a computer connected to ISP B they 
must route the data through at least one EP to bridge the gap between ISP networks. The 
complexity of the connections increases as networks are bridged. 
Countries can be viewed in abstract terms as single sets of domestic networks. In 
order for Country A to communicate with Country Y they must be either directly connected 
to each other's networks or share connections in common through the global network. This 
creates a loss of control over the individual nation's connection to the elttemal Internet. 
Should Country A's neighbors decide to cut off its connections to the network, Country A 
will lose the ability to communicate with points outside of its domestic borders. Therefore in 
order to prevent a disconnection Country A is bound to follow the norms and standards 
accepted by their neighbors. If Country A was to provoke its neighbors by pemutting or 
practicing unacceptable behavior on the network, Country A's neighbors could simply solve 
the problem by disconnecting Country A from the rest of the world Should Country A 
somehow offend all of its physical neighbors it will be very difficult to maintain a reliable 
connection to the global Internet. 
This reliance upon "voluntary" interconnection affects the external sovereignty of 
nations. Nations must keep in mind the satisfaction of their neighbors when designing 
network infrastructure and policy. There choices within the global Internet are somewhat 
restricted by the whims of those who provide border conneckions. 
~ Baker (2000 
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Unobvious Content 
Levels fl#' Connection 
In order for information to pass from one Internet point to another it must travel 
through several layers of connectivity. The data begins on ~e user'. s computer as a request 
to their network interface. The network interface could be in the form of a modem which 
connects to the phone line, a cable modem which connects to the cable Tv structure, 
Ethernet card which connects to an Ethernet connecttion, or any other number of network 
capable devices. The network interface than sends data out through the "local loop carrier" 
or local va~Frastructure. The local loop carrier is comprised of whatever ia~frastruc~ture the 
message must puss through in order to reach the user's Internet Service Provider. If a 
telephone connection is used the local loop carrier is the w~iri~rig fra►ni a user's home to their 
ISP's phone. After traveling across this v~Erastru~ the data has reached the Internet 
Service Provider's internal network. If the data is destined for a location outside of the user's 
ISP's internal network, the data than travels on to other ISPs through the customer's ISP's 
backbone connection. 
The network does not understand the information which is crossing over it. It doesn't 
even necessarily understand what kind of information is being t~~ansmitted. The network is 
dumb. 
Modern computer networks such as the Internet are based upon the OSI model of 
networking. The OSI model describes the different abstraction levels of information which 
cross over computer networks. There are seven levels in totals: 
l . Physical -- The connection which stretches from point A to paint B. ~Jn a 
small s~~ale Etl~rrnet based network this level would consist of the cabling 
v~~hich interconnects compufi~rrs. 
2. Link -- This level is abstracted as the connection from one network 
adapter or interpreter to another. For example on an Ethernet network, #his 
level exists between the Ethernet card located in computer A and the Ethernet 
card in computer B. The adapters in each computer rely on the physical layer 
3s Forouzan (2403j, p. 20 
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to actually tra~.smi~ information. The adapters however, only understand the 
existence of other adapters and usually assume the reliability of and do not 
interface with the physical layer. 
3. Network —The network level of the BSI model abst~~cts by network type. Un 
the Internet most networks utilize a TCPIIP network for connnunication. 
4. 'Tr~~r~sport -- The transport level deals with what t~~pe of packets or information 
is sent across the network. It is a sort of vrnapper for the actual data portion of 
the information sent. tJDP and TCP are the most common transport types. 
5. Session -- The session allows several different network connec~ons to 
simultaneously connect across the network to a single user or client. 
6. Presentation —The presentation level is meant to transform data into a 
mutually a~ upon fo~
36
7. Application —The application level of the {BSI is the highest level of 
abstraction wig the OSI model. This is the level in Bch data is actually 
understood and utilized by the program on the users computer. For example a 
web browsing application "sees" data as web pages, not bits and bytes of 
information s~trea~nng across the network.11~ost applications allow the 
previous levels of the BSI model to actually t<1~ns~nit, receive, and interpret 
information into a format usable by the application. 
Tlie 7 levels of the OSI model do not necess~~rly understand each other. For e~:ample 
the physical layer does not understand anything about the higher levels of abstraction. It 
exists simply to transmit data from one point to anotl~r. Similarly the datalink and network 
levels only unders~Land what is necessi~ry to send information from one point to another, they 
do not deal with the type or content of the information that is being sent. ~m~ once the 
information reaches the session level does it begin to become coherent or understandable by 
the client. The application level is the final level of abstraction and represents the final format 
of data that reaches the client program. Only the client and server applications know for sure 
what the information being transmitted means. 
36 Forouzan (2003), p. 29 
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Encryption or other forms of masking the true content of data can occur at nnany of 
the OSI levels, Encryption can ~ built into levels .including and above the CJSI's network 
level. This creates a complication for any t~rpe of monitoring. Most forms of encryption 
contain no method for which an unauthorized third party to easily decode the content of a 
message. Although it is usually possible to break encryption through repeated brute force 
attempts at guessing the password or key, this method is often extremely time consuming and 
thus impractical. 
This form of information abstraction affects the int~~nal sovereignty of nation states. 
In relegating the -true purpose and meaning behind data to the upper application levels of the 
OSI model, the content and context~~al reference necesss~ry to understand information only 
exists at the source and destination of Internet t~~a~ic. There is no i~riherent ability for data to 
be understandable at any level below the application level. Thus nation states do not have any 
tee over the ability to monitor information aver it leaves its source or before it reaches 
1tS destlnatl4n. Despite there being no tee much of the t~. ic which ►asses across the 
Internet is easily placed into context based upon the packet's header information. For 
example it is usually easy to differentiate between web, email, and FTP ts~a~ffic. Thus despite 
the OSI model some t~:~affic can be intercepted and understood without the need for the client 
or server application to interpret it. 
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CHAPTER 3. REGIME ACCEPTANCE 
Pressure from Market Forces 
A major factor driving the acceptance of technological norms and standards are world 
economic mazkets. The technological regime mentioned in the previous chapter was 
responsible for the acceptance of a number of technologies which directly impact the ability 
of nation states to control content and information (Packet based routing, OSI abstraction 
levels, etc). These standards not only became prevalent because of technological reasons 
(they were designed to solve a problem posed by DARPA but continued into the public 
s~tc~r as the primary answer for large scale networking) they eventually picked up the 
influence of world wide markets. 
By promoting worldwide standards the market is able to benefit from the increased 
efficiencies presented by economies of scale. When a majoriTy of the world population uses a 
single technological standard companies are able to produce products with little domestic 
market differentiation; the same networking product produced for the US market will work 
with little or no change in Europe or Asia 
Economic markets support the technological regimes for several other reasons as well. 
The main factors influencing markets toward this specific set of #ethnological standards are a 
desire for security, transparency, and stability. 
Security 
Just as security is a concern for physical and monetary transactions, security is also a 
major concern over computer networks. This is especially true when real world forms of 
transaction are expected to take place securely over the Internet. Market actors demand that 
their transactions take place in an environment where they can have a reasonable amount of 
security. The open ended nature of current TCP/IP implementations of the Internet and the 
OSI networking model a11ow for an organization to implement a large number of different 
security strategies. Ong of the most common is encryption. Data can be encrypted on one end 
of the Internet connection and decrypted on the other end with a reasonable expectation of 
security. The OSI model allows the organization to focus upon security at the application 
level and largely ignore the network infrastructure. 
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The CIA model can once again bring to light a number of the security concerns faced 
by organizations on large scale networks. Confidence concerns who has access tcj what 
information. The open ended nature of the current Internet system allows companies to 
design networked systems with propriet<~ry security —proprietary in the sense that only their 
permitted associates are allowed aCCeSS t0 the data. whether an organization uses one of the 
openly available encryption technologies or invests the time and money to develop their own 
system, the freedom with which they can choose a solution allows them to determine their 
own level of confidence. Integrity is insured via similar means. By controlling who has 
access to what information organizations also control who has an ability to change 
information. Although the current networking system is susceptible to information ati;acks 
involving the interruption and monitoring of t,1.~affic, a variety of solutions .are widely 
available to address these concerns. Encryption and error correction can be combined to 
almost insure the delivery of secure content. Accessibility, or n~ant~~ini.ng an accessible store 
of information, is one of the more major concerns of the current system. It has become more 
and more frequent for denial of service asks to restrict the availability of information on 
the Internet. These DOS attacks exploit weaknesses in the TCP/iP networking protocols to 
"clog" the lines and prevent access to a certain resource such as website or database server. 
Although this is a flaw inherent in the networking i ~ cture, nevi technologies are being 
developed to combat the problem and promise companies an increased level of insured 
accessibility on the Internet. The Internet satisfies all tlu~e CiA demands.. 
Transparency 
Market actors also seek transparency in networking architecture and technology so 
that they can observe and understand network interactions. This is similar and somewhat 
related to their demand for security. The realization of network security requires a certain 
description and understanding behind the technologies involved in networking sfl that 
security can be insured. 
The TCP/IP protocol and the general infrastructure of the Internet is based upon 
designs which are openly accessible to anyone interested in analyzing them. In this manner 
the physical and software infrastructure of the Internet is open to the analysis of 
organizations. They can have an understanding of the infrastructure which equals that of 
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those who designed it. By allowing organizations to realize this level of knowledge the 
Internet permits them a sense of safety in knowing that there are in fact very few unknov~rns 
and surprisF~s in the syst3em. 
Nations who openly place access controls on the Internet put into question the 
security of the protocols and infrastructure of the Internet. Companies wishing to have 
confidence in the security and integrity of the network i.x~i~astructure will be wary of 
investing in an area with unl~nown infrastructlural elements which could potentially affect the 
delivery of their information. Thus inter~r~ational organizations seeking to establish an 
information presence within a nation state will advocate an open form of control which can 
produce reliable and predictable results. For this reason orga~aizations will demand 
transparency in infrastructure and information controls. 
Stability 
I1~larket actors also seek stability in netwo~g technology and policy. l~Zarkets invest 
enormous amounts of money to cr~rate the in~tructure and technology neees;sary to realize 
market t~~nsactions over computer networks and thus expect the conditions under which they 
invest to remain somewhat stable. Technology based information controls inherently cause 
complications and thus ine#~iciencies within IT networks. These controls also create potential 
additional points of failure within the network. Depending upon how the system is set up, 
should a control point fail the networks which rely upon the control point could fail as well. 
Sovereignty 
These pressures upon governments affect the internal sovereign choices that nations 
make. Markets require or lobby governments for their cooperation in providing IT networks 
which allow them security, transparency in networking, and stability. This pressure affects 
the rational decision making process of the nation state by shifting the rewazd/payoff for 
acquiescing to the technological regime of the Internet. 
External sovereignty is also affected due to the requirement for border connections to 
the global network to meet basic network standards. The nation's choice for internal 
networking is somewhat open to domestic government preference or propriety. The external 
links to the global network, however, must comply with standards in order to intemperate 
and communicate successfully with the world network. 
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES 
China 
The People's Republic of China is a country rated as having severe restrictions on the 
Internet. The Freedom House justified this rating b►a.sed upon the follov~ing restrictions: 
".11~ew ~`hinese laws re~►uire Internet companies to secure licenses and to be 
held responsibl e for "il legal "content carried on their systems. T 7~~'3' must 
keep records of users and their messages. ... For sending or receiving 
messages critical of ~ei~iing or of Communist policy, however, a Chinese web 
surfer can face harassment or up to 10 years in prison. Mast dune, the founder 
of the,~rst harnacn rights ~e~ site in China, .Huang Q% was accused of 
"subverting state power. "His last message: "Thank you all, tanks to 
everyone devoted to democracy of China. T 7~~eJ' [the pal iced are here now, so 
~ang. » »37 
According tQ world Banl~ data China had in 33,7(30,0 Internet users in 20o I . This 
is roughly 2.?% of the Chinese population. Aside from the legal restrictions mentioned by the 
Freedom House, China al so ~ several well documented technological re;~trictions. 
Governmen# ~testri~+ans 
In 1997 the Chinese government established certain guidelines regarding the material 
which should be accessible to the public. These national regulations are meant to in#luence 
both individuals accessing the Internet and Int~rrnet providers. Both individuals and providers 
are held responsible. The guidelines themselves are meant to be implemented by the Internet 
Service Providers. The implementation of these regulations is manifested by China's firev~all. 
These restrictions mandate that an Internet provider or access point prevent access to: 
1. Information that goes against the basic principles set in the constitution; 
2. Infonn~ation that endangers national security, divulges st~~.te secrets, subverts the 
government, or undermines national unity; 
3. Information that is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state; 
37 Press Freedom Survey 2Oo 1 
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4. Infon~on that instigates ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination, or that undermines 
national unity.
5. Information that undermines the state's policy towards religions, or that preaches the 
teachings of evil cults or that promotes feudalistic and superstitious beliefs; 
6. Information that disseminates rumors, disturbs social order, or undermines social 
stability; 
7. Information that spreads pornography or other salacious materials; promotes 
gambling, violence, homicide, or terrorism; or instigates crimes; 
8. Information that insults or slanders other people, or ' ges upon other people's 
legitimate rights and interests; or 
9. Other information prohibited by the law or a~3ministrative regulations. 
This relatively short List of restrictions is broad enough in scope to limit access to 
almost any information which can be rationalized as destabil~ or offensive to the state. 
The Firewall 
The exact manner in which China's firewall operates is kept a state secret. Precise 
knowledge as to the per in v~rhich China filters and monitors information would greatly 
simplify the task of bypassing or compromising the firewall. Thus most of the information 
available concerning China's firewall was gathered through observation, speculation, and 
common sense. 
The most basic manner in which the firewall woks is by blocking entire "portions" of 
the Internet$. This is most likely done through a list of web sites and their associated IP 
addresses tone of the most basic forins of identification on the Internet, it is ~ to an 
Internet postal address). This list is then cross checked with any attempts to access the web. 
If the requested website is on the banned list, the user is prevented from accessing it. In many 
systems similar to the Chinese one (such as the one exis-ling in Saudi ~►.rabia3~), a user is 
presented with a rness~age saying the website the user attempted to access has been blocked. 
The Chinese firewall does riot, however, alert the user that the website has been blocked. 
ss Zittrain (2003 
39 Edelman (2002) 
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This prevents the user from knowing at what Ievel the connection failed. As far as the user 
knows, he or she may have entered a wrong web address, there could be network problems, 
or the website could be down for technical reasons. This is perhaps more effective than the 
Saudi Arabian system because if a user attempts to access a site and finds that it is blocked, 
he or she can at least infer some small amount of infornation regarding the content of the site. 
The Chinese system prevents the user from realizing even this small amount of information. 
It most likely lets the request timeout or sends an inaccessible or not found message back to 
the computer. This type of firewall is both cheap and easy to implement. It operates at a very 
low network level tat the Network level (3j of the ~C3SI model) and involves very little 
processing power because there is no analysis done on the actual information. The 
originating address is the only concern of the firewall, and this is simply cross checked with a 
dat<~base. This type of filtering can occur without any actual understanding of the information 
being transferred. The database of banned sites is most l.ikely created by a hybrid process of 
hu:rnan made entries with a simple automated web spider that traver:~es the web looking for 
sites which contain illegal material. 
A higher and more complicated form of filtering has recently been reported in 
China40. Some arras report that sites are no longer simply blocked by their Internet address, 
but by the very content of the information transfen~ed. This is known as "keyword" filtering. 
The filt~rring system examines the actual information being transferred and determines 
whether the content of the information contains cerltain banned keywords. If a web site or 
message is found to contain some of these keywords, access is prevented. This is more 
complcaxed than the simple IP bused filt#~ing mentioned above in several ways. The filtering 
system must understand the t~~►ffic . being sent. This is done at the application level of network 
t~~ic and requires a thorough understanding of the different protocols involved in network 
t~~ c. The filter would intercept t~~~ic either on its way from or to a user, analyze the t~~a~ic, 
and determine whether the contents of the t~~ffic violate the filtering rules. If a violation is 
found any number of options are open to the filter. It could simply keep a log of the 
violations or throw away the- traffic which didn't pass the filter. At this level the filter also 
has the capability to alter the contents of the t1-a~ic. 
40 Zittrain (2003) 
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Both the sample I~ firewall and content filter could be e~lished at different points 
on the network. The Internet Service Provider could be rnandalted to include tl:~se 
mechaun~a~ms in their systems, or the goverment may esi~blsli them independently of the 
iSPs. I# v~rould seem most likely that the goverment maintains a base IP firev~~.11 at the lacal 
point where the Internet backbone feed China and than place more bnrdensorne restrictions 
un ISPs. Pbr example the t~~ c is filtered at the IP or addn~ss level when it enters Chi  and 
processed at the content level immediately More it is sent to the user at the Internet. Service 
Provider.. 'Phis would give the government some base ins~ce that they have the ultimate 
control over what er~t#rrs and leaves the country, but shames the burden for more accurate and 
individual filtering with the IMP. 
Trough this analysis we are able to draw a fairly complete pig of the Chinese 
firewall. The re:~trictions reportedly vary across China. The most advanced filt~rrs have the 
capability to block specil~c content within a webste rather teat the website in .its enti~rty, 
initiate "time outs" where a user's access is limited for a certain amount of time after 
searching for "banned" keywords, and monitor chatrooms and restrict the ~s of dissident 
comment~~ ~ . ~'h d ' c form of fit is likel -the roost advanced in China and not et y~~~ y y 
implemented nationwide. In areas with small "loyal" Internet populations there bably 
exists situp er, less sophisticated and less costly versions:; for example simply an IP or name 
bared ~~all. 
~Sa~~~ ~ra~a 
In X001 the V~Torld ,I3a:rk reported that there were 300,000 Internet :.users, or l .~% of 
# population, in Saudi ~►~abia. a Prom Fracas report identified Saudi- Arabia as having 
a modet+e level of resfi~ieton. In the Saudi Arabian ease tads level of restriction translates 
into a fix~~~all based content control system not dissindlar in .purpose from the Cl ieSe 
example.. There are a few key differences. T#~e Saudi ~!►rabian frewall notifies the user when 
a site ~ been blocked. 'Ids allov~s the Internet user to di#~erentiate between sites which 
simply happen to be inaccessible for an indet~:rrnr~aate reason ar~d those sites which have been 
actively blocked by the government firewall. 
a' t3aranowsk~ f 2UO2) 
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The Saudi Arabian government has established an Internet Services Unit (ISU) 
char ed with the re nsbili of prodding Internet services wig Saudi ~►rabia.'42 The unit g ~ ~'' 
has a number of responsibilities; among them is the establishment and maintenance of a 
national f~~ewall which prevents certain websites from being accessed from within Saudi 
Arabia. The ISU describes the filtering _system and policy: 
"All incoming Web traf~`ic to the Kingdom passes through a proxy farm 
system implementing a content filtering software. A list of addresses for 
banned sites is maintained by this filtering system. This list is updated daily 
based on the content, filtering policy. A list of pornographic sites is provided 
periodically by the filtering software provider. However, this list is not 
comprehe»sive due to the high proliferation cmd diversity of pornographic 
sites. Therefore, KACST (King Abdulaziz City for Science arld Technology) 
maintains aweb-based form that ~rsers can fill-out to report saes they feel 
should be blocked Hundreds of requests are received daily. A team offull-
time employees at KACST study these requests and implement them only if 
justified As for reon pornographic sites, KACST receives orders to block 
them from related government bodies (refer to content of filtering policy). "~3
Saudi Arabia has passed legislation which prevents users front publishing or 
accessing informat%on of the following t;Ypes~: 
1. Anything confiravening a fundamental principle or legislation, or infringing 
the sanctity of Islam and its benevolent Sharih, or breaching public decency. 
2. Any~g cont~~ry to the state or its system. 
3. deports or news ing to the Saudi Arabian armed forces, without the 
approval of the competent authorities. 
4. Publication of official state laws, agreements or statements before they are 
o#~ dally made public, unless approved by the competent authorities. 
5. Anything damaging to the dignity of heads of states or heads of credited 
diplomatic missions in the ~gdom, or harms relations with those countries. 
a2 The Internet Services Unit (2004) Homepage 
a3 The Internet Services Unit (2Q04) Local content Filtering Procedure 
Arab ~~:eway (2000 
39 
6. Any false information ascribed to state o#~icials or those of private or public 
domestic ~istitutons and bodies, liable to cause them or heir offices harm, or 
e their integrity. 
7. The propagation of subversive ideas or the disruption of public order or 
disputes among citizens. 
$. An liable to promote or incite crime, or advocate violence aga~~nst others 
in any shape or form. 
9. Any slanderous or libelous material against individuals. 
The Saudi Arabian government also requires that Internet service providers follow a 
set of rules meant to rotect the "constituents of the native network:'~sp 
1. Service providers shall determine Internet access eligibility t}u-ough access 
accounts, user identification and effective passwords for the use of the access 
point or subsequent points and linking that through tracing and investigation 
pro es that record the time spent, addresses accessed or to which or 
through which access was attempted, and the size and type of files copied, 
whenever possible or nece sauy. 
2. The use of anti-virus pro es and protection against concealing addresses 
or printing passwords and files. 
3. Endeavour to avoid errors in applications that may provide loopholes that may 
be exploited for subversive activities or to obtain data not permitted for use 
for whatever reason, 
4. Restriction of the provision of IntE~rnet services tcj the end-user through the 
Internet service unit at King Abdulaziz city for sciences and technology. 
5. Keep a manual and electronic reamer with comprehensive information on 
end-users, their addresses, telephone numbers, purpose of use, and private 
Internet access accounts, and provide the authorities with a copy thereof, if 
necessary. 
6. Not to publish any printed directories contain subscribers •and end-
us~rrs •names and addresses, without their agreement. 
as Arab tTateway (2t)41) 
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USA 
The United States is identified as having fair restrictions by the Fr~~dom House 
report. In 2001 the world Banl~ statistics showed that there were 142,823,000 Internet users 
in the US (50°/© of the population). Although legislafi~on has attempted to control certain 
forms of content and communication on the Internet, these controls generally fall in line with 
prior legislation regarding previous fog of media. Most of the atl~e,rnpted legislation has 
sought to control "indecent" material on the Internet and prevent its viev~►Ting by inappropr~~ate 
persons (for example children). 
The United States has been subject to several rounds of legislation which sought to 
limit access to the Internet in several different contexts. In 1996 the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA) was passed in an attempt to protect minors from indecent material in the 
online world. The CDA made it illegal to t~~ansmit "indecent material" to minors. On June 26, 
.1997 the CDA was strucl~ down by the Supreme Court as imposing unconstitutional 
restrictions upon a "unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication. "~ 
In 1998 the Child Online Protection Act (CODA) was passed. CODA creates criminal 
penalties for the commercial distribution of material deemed harmful to minors: 
"~~hoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in 
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the T~orld T3~ide T~eb, makes arty 
cor~nmunicatior~ for .commercial purposes that is available to any minor and 
that includes any material that is harmful to minors smell be fined not mo- re 
than $S0, 000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both. " 47
"Material that is harmful to minors. --The term 'material that is harmful to 
minors' means any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, 
recording, writing, or other natter of art, 1~i'nd that is v~scene ar that--tbe 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would final 
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to 
appal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; depicts, describes, 
or represents, in a manner patently o, f~`ensive with respect to minors, an actual 
or stimulated sexual act or sexual contact, an .actual or simulated normal or 
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibitl'on of the genitals or post-pubescent 
`~ EPiC {199.8) 
a~ EPIC (1998) 
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feral a breast; and taken as a whol e, lacks serious I iterary, artistic, political, 
or scientt~c value, for minors. "'~ 
The COPA is currently being challenged in court and has already been deemed 
unconstitutional by several government entities. Individual US states have also enacted 
various fot~ns of Internet access control regulations. These regulations generally attempt to 
control "decency" on the Internet; some have attempted to regulate or censor the Internet 
within public institutions such as libraries. 
~ EPIC { 1 x'98) 
42 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
~tegim~ 
The Internet is more than simply an agreement on a c~ set of standards; it is a 
relationship among states which holds them to a general and long term obligation to follow 
the Internet's set of norms and principles. Xsasner defines this long term obligation as the 
key difference between a "regime" and a simple "agreement."~~ The Internet can be viewed 
as an international regime bused upon the technical, a~~rninistrative, and usage standards 
which allow the Intfrrnet to function and interconnect. ~Tu notes that under the 
institutionalist's view of Realism "states will adhere to the rules of this regime if and only if 
it is in their best Interest to do so."S0 The decision for a state to accept an international regime 
is a cos~t/benefits calculation; the state will decide if the potential benefits gained from 
become a ~nen~.ber of a regime outweigh the losses associated with jonung it. In the case of 
the Internet, states have the potential to lose some of their sovereign control over the flow of 
information. Attempts to re-exert control over the Internet can result in a decrease in 
economic and other ex benefits.5~ Again Wu notes that "the institutionalist model 
predicts that power-maximizing states will act to regulate cyberspace as much as possible 
without tlu~eatenng the other benef is that the Internet delivers."5~ Therefore the Internet is a 
re~e use n~e~mbership contains many levels of compliance and exception; those who 
choose membership still have an ability to retain some control over their absolute adherence 
to standard practice. 
As a function designed to maximize the utility of a state, these nations who choose to 
place controls on the Internet do so as a rirsult of several di#~erent contributing factors. 
General comparisons between the Freedom Douse report and the World Bank statistics can 
reveal several of these factors. 
a9 X:rasner (1995 p. 2, 3 
S0 yVu (1997), p. b5b 
S i Wu (1997), p. 659 
s2 Wu (1997, p. 6b(3 
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Figure 3. Populations with Internet Restriction 
~'T 
Contributing Factors 
Population 
User Populations (Charts: Internet User Populations with Internet Restricition, and 
Populations with Internet restriction) 
User populations (the number of users within in a given nation state) appear to have a 
significant impact upon the level of restriction within the state. When the Freedom House 
data. concer W_ing Internet restrictions is matched with the World Bank statistics regarding the 
number of Internet users in each country and also with general population sl~tistics we can 
see that a majority of Internet users live within countries with "fair restriction." (See figure 
This indicates that countries with "fair restriction" have a much higher percentage of the 
world population of Internet users. There is a direct relationship between the percentage of 
Internet users a country has and the level of restriction. 
I~Tations with "fair restriction" have a larger percentage of their population online (an 
average of 23% of the population uses the Internet) than us~rrs within restricted (2%) and 
moderately restricted (5%) nations. This does not necessarily indicate a direct causal link, 
Figure 5 
however the relationship is prominent. This relationship could be indicative of several 
different general scenarios. 
• The more users. a country has the more difficult it is for that country to place 
cost effective controls upon the general population. 
• The more users a country has the more pressure they place upon the regime to 
offer Less controlled access to the Internet. 
• Fewer restrictions plac:.ed upon access will result in a increased percentage of 
the population wanting access. 
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Economy 
Severe 
Income (Chart: Restrictions vs CNIPC) 
There also appears to be a relationship between the per capita income of a nation and 
the degree of Internet restriction realized in that country. The average income of a resident 
living in a country with "fair" Internet restrictions is a little less than $13,000 USD whereas 
the income of a resident living under moderate and severe restriction is just under $3,000 and 
$1,500 USD respectively. Again this relationship is not necessarily causal however it is 
certainly strong and could be indicative of several things: 
• With higher incomes the advantages Internet access brings to the general 
population and thus the nation state are greater (for example more commerce 
occurs over the Internet or more private investment in infi astructure can offset 
the need for the nation state to expend its own funds) thus as income increase 
the cost related to restricting Internet access increases. 
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• Countries with a higher per capita income naturally have a higher percentage 
of their population with computer and Internet access. Countries with low 
incomes simply do not have the population base necessary to warrant full 
regime acceptance by the nation state. 
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Figure 7. Restriction vs. High Tech Imports 
Severe 
High Tech Imports 
Should economic markets have an effect on the Internet restriction level of a country, 
than this should be reflected in the amount of high tech imports a country receives. If a 
country seeks to receive offshore investment in the form of high technology (and especially 
information technology) goods than they should be under pressure from the economic 
community to reduce Internet controls. When comparing the restriction level of countries 
(via the Freedom House report) with the percentage of high tech imports (see Figure 7) a 
country receives (this was calculated by taking the percentage of high tech imports a country 
receives and dividing by the total imports of a country —both figures from the World Bank 
statistics). Due to the unavailability of a high tech import statistics for many countries, these 
results are by no means conclusive; however there is a definite difference between the fair 
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and moderate level ~ 10.41 %and 5.75% respectively). The severe level's percentage (8.44%) 
is surprisingly higher than the moderate level.. This can be accounted for by the fact that only 
two countries with severe restriction levels had high tech import statistics available (China 
16.51 %and A,.zerbaijan 0.37%). Both the deviation between those two countries is great and 
the low number of samples results in a higher margin of error. Some general conclusions can 
be drawn however. 
• The higher tie amount of high tech imports a country has, the more pressure 
will be exerted upon them by the international market to not restrict Internet 
access. This enables the international r~uu-ket to preserve its security, 
t~.~nsparency, and stability. 
• The general relationship between high income countries and louver resection 
has already been noted. Generally more developed countries have a higher 
percentage of high tech imports, thus this relationship could simply be a result 
of a general link between "developed" nations and unrestricted access. 
Government Regime Type 
There appears to be definite link between the regime type of a nation's government 
and their degree of Internet "freedom." The nations rated as having restricted Internet access 
appear to have a large number of authoritarian regimes amongst them. The Freedom house 
rated 18 countries as having restricted access. They are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, China, Congo, Cuba, Bthiopia, I~:~~aldistan, Kenya, Lao FDR, Sierra Done, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Taj ikis~tan, Tunisia, and Turlcrr~enistan.lVlost of these countries are 
considered as having authoritarian regimes and do not generally offer their citizenry a high 
level of personal freedom, hence restrictions on the Internet fall in line with previous regime 
decisions to restrict other personal f~~eedoms. 
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A General Relationship 
In analyzing the general characteristics of countries with fair, moderate, and heavy 
restrictions on the Internet there appears to be a general link between "development" and free 
Internet access. The term "development" is not precise and refers to several different general 
characteristics of a nation: an advanced economy which can provide its citizenry with a 
relatively high standard of living, government leaders are generally chosen through a 
democratic process, a large percentage of the population has access to a computer; other 
personal freedoms are not significantly infringed upon, etc. 
This general relationship also indicates that countries which don't restrict other forms 
of communication generally don't restrict Internet communication (See chart: Internet and 
Press Freedom). The Freedom House also noted this correlation.53 Moreover the Internet is 
generally freer than the press. It must be noted, however, that the Freedom house rates 187 
ss Freedom of the Press Report 2001 
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countries with freedom of the press ratings whereas they only rate 131 countries with Internet 
restrictions ratings. 
The Impact of Information Sovereignty 
The ability of a nation state to control the information which passes across and into its 
borders brings with it a ~tential for both great benefit and great abuse. 
The ability to monitor and control information grants the nation staxe an ability to 
extend some of its more traditional roles into the world of information. These could involve 
everything from the provision of basic infrastructure-related services to the policing of online 
criminal offenses. Many of the current problems which plague the online world could 
potentially be solved if the nation state were to preserve an ability to control information on 
the Internet. The originators of unsolicited email, or spam, could be tracked down with little 
trouble. Online crimes could be investigated more easily and with an increased efficiency. 
A nation which maintains control over the flow of online communications has the 
ability to abuse a number of basic hwnan rights. When there exists an ability to monitor and 
control communications the potential exists for abuse from the governing powers. The most 
infamous example of this is the dystopia of George Orwell's 1984.Orwell presented a world 
in which the government controlled and monitored all communications to the point of having 
a though# police which punished any form of subversive thought. With the growing 
importance of online communications within the daily lives and normal communication 
patterns of many people, having a complete ability to monitor online communications would 
make an Orwellian future much easier to bring to reality. 
The simple ability to abuse control does not guarantee that a dystopian future will 
become a maiity. The tradeoffs between the beneficial side of inforn~ation controls and the 
potenfial abuses which become possible must be carefully considered when any sort of 
controls are under consideration. 
Future Considerations 
Bypassing Software 
There are several ways in which technology based Internet restrictions can be
circumvented or bypassed. The simplest way is through the use of web proxies or mirrors in 
50 
an outside country. A web proxy acts as a go-between for a web user. The user sends a 
nest for a web page to the proxy machine, which will in turn fetch the page and send it to 
the user. 'Thus the simple IP firewall does not know the final destination requested by the 
user. These proxies could be blocked by the IP firewall in the same way that it blocks a 
webpage, however their relative abundance on the Internet makes them difficult to locate. 
A similar problem exits with mirroring or carping pages on the Internet. For 
example a popular web page offer has several mirrors, or copies of itself, located at different. 
places. This ensures that users from different areas of the globe have fast access to the site. It 
also makes the job of an IP filter more di#Ticult because a user can access the same 
information at di#~erent places on the web. Similarly many locations cache web pages to keep 
a history of the Internet or for building search engines. Places such as the Internet Archive 
cache pages to build "historic" snapshots of the web. The search engine Google makes its 
web cache available to users in case a website has changed or is inaccessible. 
web translation services can be used to provide a similar service. A clever web user 
could have a banned web page translated from Chinese to Chinese by any number of online 
translation services. This would effectively provide them a proxy by which to view any site 
banned by the IP firewall. 
All of these methods provide some degree of freedom from behind an IP firewall. 
These "tricks" are not inherent weaknesses in the firewall but simply weaknesses in the 
selected denial of pages. Should the firewall a to find ALL proxies, mirrors, etc. tlhan it 
would be almost completely effective. These methods would not, however be e#~ective 
aga~~nst a content filter. These "tricks" only change the apparent source of information, not 
the information itself. 
In order to penetrate a content filter you must use more complicated means. The 
creative use of alternate spellings and encoded text is one way. The most effective way is 
through the use of cryptography or steganography. When modern forms of encryption are 
implemented a user can be relatively sure that only those with access to the necessi~.ry keys, 
passwords, etc will be able to view the content of a message. This would prevent a content 
filter from flagging restricted material because it could not read the true contents. Should the 
content filter decide to block ALL encrypted material the user would have to use something 
even more complicated. 
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~teganography is the science of hiding information within various media. For 
example it is possible to encode data within an image without charging the ~e in any 
noticeable wayS4. This disguises- infor~~ation within. a "han~~less" looking package. This 
information could also be encr!~pted for an added layer of security. 
The problem with both cryptography and st~rganography lie in their hidden na~are. In 
order for an encr~ message to reach a large audience, that audience must know the secret 
key or password; similarly for a steganographically encoded mess~~ge to r~rach a large 
audience that audience must have the correct so#~ware to extract the message and know the 
location of the mess~~ge. Distribute this information to a large audience without informing 
the governn~.ent is a very difficult problem. 
Arms Race 
Information technologies can be controlled by the nation state. This control, however, 
must be ac#ive and evolve as information technology evolves. Thus, any particular 
technological solution to the control of information technology., will likely not be valid as the 
nature and speed of IT increases.. Legislative controls can exist without enforcement; 
however have little impact unless actively enforced. Z~is constant improvement in 
technology is a fundamental shift front previous communications technologies. The printed 
word, although it has benefited from several improvements reducing cost end product%on 
time, has changed very little from its beginning. Information technology changes constantly 
in terns of melkhod of 1x~ansport, s~p~eed, b~eadt}, and_. nat~~re. Thus there is a conundn~m in the 
nation state's goal to enforce -its legitimate control :over the flow of information; the 
technologies needed to control infor~rnation technologies must advance at least as quickly as 
information technology itself. VVhetl~r or not stages are. willing. to invest a resources 
necessary to develop and implement controls is a question le#I to individual states. 
"Laws of Censorship" 
Although the technical capabilities of a firewall can be refined over time, and increase 
with need and advances in processing power, there are other factors which intrinsically limit 
~ ~Ohnson, uSteganogTaphy" 
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the extent to which information controls can be implemented. The following "Laws of Anti-
Censorshipss" have been proposed: 
i . The difi'iculty of blocking an anti-censorship technology is proportional to its 
ties to coerce. 
2. A circumvention technology will be blocked up to the limit of resources the 
enemy is willing to invest in blocking the technology. 
3. The amount of effort an enemy will put in to defeating a system is 
proportional to the users using that system. 
The first law expresses a very important point: countries which participate in the 
world economic markets will have to succumb to economic pressures when censorship 
affects business. For example, the Chinese government is trying to prevent the widespread 
use of en tion technolo ies throu im rt restrictionssb. This is a result of the im t cryp g ~ ~ P~ 
encryption has upon monitoring technologies; the government loses the capability to monitor 
and censor information when it is beyond their recognition due to encryption. Business 
however demands encryption as the only safe way to guarantee confidentiality in things like 
monet<~ry transactions and the transmission of personal information. without this guarantee 
e-cor~uneree cannot take hold witl~.in China.. Therefore the Cl~~inese government must play a 
careful balance between its control of the sovereign Chinese portion of the Internet and the 
commercial fi~eedom which business demands. 
The second and third laws bring up another point; with increasing percentages of the 
world using the Internet, governments must expand their controls to maintain any sort of 
effectiveness. This costs money. There comes a point where the cos~tlbenefit ratio becomes 
too burdensome to continue. The same is also true of technologies which attempt to bypass 
the technological controls. If a new circumvention technology requires a tremendous 
investment in monitoring technology to offset, than the costlbenefit ratio again becomes 
burdensome. 
ss Baranowski (2002) 
~ Crampton (2002) 
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A New T~ga~~my 
Although the Freedom House provides a very thorough and useful statistical base for 
a~r~aly~zing Internet restrictions any future study would benefit from a more strucfi~red 
approach to the problem. An approach which categorized restrictions into different categories 
such as technical, legislative, or access bassi and rated each restrictions severity would a11ow 
an analysis with both deeper insights into the effects of restriction in general and the effects 
of specific forms of restriction. Nations do not always provide easily accessible information 
about their Internet restrictions; therefore any fixture survey will s~a~er from this inherent 
problem. Likely the user is the best resource for real word information regarding usage 
patterns within states. A.n open survey which allowed users to note or mention any general or 
specific controls on their Internet access could allow a broad base of informants and statistics. 
This data could than, in ~ be collected ands 'zed into general country and global 
reports. 
Conc~us~on 
Nations wish to preserve their control over the flows of information; however several 
technological and social factors force them to make a costlbenefits decision on whether or 
not to allow unrestricted access to new technologies such as the Int~;rnet. Chapter 1 of this 
thesis ex~d the Internet as a fundamental shift in the communications c~a~bility of 
huma~nl~ind and argued that the Internet can be conside~r+ed as a technology and standards 
regime which ensures the interoperability and technical sl~andards of domestic .computer 
networks which connect to the global Internet. In order to gain the full benefits available 
from the information revolution they must subscribe to the technological, administrative, and 
usage standards which allows the Internet to function. In subscribing to this regime they give 
up a cer~tairi amount of control over the flows of information within their once sovereign area 
of information control. Many of the Internet's b►~ase technologies directly affect the nation's 
ability to monitor and control the flow of information. An examination of the technological 
background of the Internet was presented in chapter two, This examination suggests that this 
new form of communication impacts the sovereign ability of the nation-state to control the 
flows of informataon both within and across its borders. Chapter three examined the role 
which int~rrnational markets play in promoting the Internet regime. ~I.arkets desire 
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compliance with the .international regime in order to ensure b~nsp~arency, security, and 
stability. l~ationlstates make a rational cos~t~benef~ts decision on the form which netwo~g 
takes with their do~rnestic boundaries and on v~~hat controls are placed upon access to the 
network. controls placed upon the technology or access of users affects the payoff of 
benefits from these new forms of information technology. There have been varied and 
diverse responses to the question of network access; from national rev~alls and strictly 
controlled access privileges, to legislative barriers and fi:~eedom of information movements. 
Chapter four introduced case studies of Internet controls in China, Saudi Arabia, and the US 
as examples of #lie dff+crent levels of control. Finally chapter eve presented aggregate data 
which indicates a relationship-between nation-state controlled access to the Internet and 
several dt~erent economic and social factors. The number of Internet users. in a country, per_ 
capita income, high-tech imparts,. and the overall t~~pe all seem to have a definite 
correlation with the degree of Internet restricfion. The Internet has the potential to greatly 
.affect the level of control t]~at the nation has over information:. rational control over 
i.nforn~ation technologies has the potential for both positive and negative consequences., any 
nation wises to exert some form of restriction or control should carefully consider the 
potential harm and potential good arising from that control. 
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